I take my presentation of the paradox from Boolos et al. (2002) . 1 First, define a function, J, from N x N (N = set of natural numbers) to N by the following diagram:
Definition. For a set E of sets of natural numbers, call a set w of natural numbers an enumerator of E if in w)))). Now, consider a language containing just the following: constants 0, 1, 2, ..., two one-place predicates N and S, a two-place predicate Î , and a two-place function symbol J. We are interested in interpretations for the language satisfying:
1. All natural numbers are in the domain. 2. The only other elements of the domain are sets of natural numbers. 3. The denotations of 0, 1, 2, ... are 0, 1, 2, ... respectively; the denotation of N is the set of all natural numbers, and the denotation of S is the set of all sets of natural numbers in the domain; the denotation of Î is the relation of membership between numbers and sets of numbers. Finally, the denotation of J is the function J extended to give some arbitrary value-say 17-for arguments that are not both numbers (that is, one or both of which are sets).
Consider the sentence ) (w wF Ø$ where F(w) is the formula below (call the sentence D).
Let I be one of the interpretations that we are interested in. Then ) (w wF Ø$ will be true in I if and only if there is no set in the domain of I that is an enumerator of the set of all sets of numbers that are in the domain of I. We know that the set of all sets of natural numbers is not enumerable (each set of natural numbers can be represented uniquely as an infinite binary sequence; it can be shown that there exists a bijection between the set of infinite binary sequences and the set of real numbers; and the set of real numbers is not enumerable), and therefore that the set of all sets of natural numbers does not have an enumerator. Therefore, the sentence D is true in the particular interpretation that has all the sets of natural numbers in its domain (call this interpretation the standard interpretation).
Definition.
We say that an interpretation B is a subinterpretation of an interpretation A if:
1 
Theorem. (Strong Löwenheim-Skolem theorem).
Let A be a nonenumerable model of an enumerable set of sentences T. Then A has an enumerable subinterpretation that is also a model of T.
By the theorem, there exists an enumerable subinterpretation, K, of the standard interpretation for which sentence D is true. That is, there is an interpretation whose domain contains only enumerably many sets of numbers, and there is no set in the domain of this interpretation that is an enumerator of the set of those sets of numbers. The apparent paradox is that we have an enumerable set which does not have an enumerator. There is, however, no paradox, because it is not correct to say that the enumerable set (the set of the sets of numbers in the domain of K) does not have an enumerator; all that we have shown is that it does not have an enumerator amongst the enumerable domain. It is still possible that a set of numbers that is not in this set is an enumerator. In fact, since the set is enumerable, this must be the case. The lesson to take is that "what a sentence should be understood as saying or meaning or denying is at least as much a function of the domain over which the sentence is interpreted as of the symbols that constitute the sentence. ) (w wF Ø$ can be understood as saying 'nonenumerably many sets of numbers exist' when its quantifiers are understood as ranging over a collection containing all numbers and all sets of numbers, as with the domain of the standard interpretation; but it cannot be so understood when its quantifiers range over other domains, and in particular not when they range over the members of enumerable domains." 1 Some philosophical discussion deriving from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem Suppose that we follow McIntosh (1979) and call a property S (expressed by the first order formula F(x) of theory T) relative if and only if there are two models M 1 and M 2 of T such that M 1 is a submodel of M 2 and for some element a in the domain of both models, a satisfies F(x) in M 1 and a does not satisfy F(x) in M 2 . 2 Then it has been shown that the property of being enumerable is a relative property. (We showed that the set of sets of numbers in the domain of K is enumerable relative to the standard model, but not enumerable relative to K.)
Using the Strong Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, it is also possible to show that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory has a countable model consisting of denumerable sets (call this model M).
3 Thus, some denumerable set is denoted by P(w); call it P(w) M . Then P(w) M is denumerable relative to the interpretation of ZF set theory that has all sets of rank less than the first inaccessible cardinal as its domain, but nondenumerable relative to M. We have exactly the same sort of relativity as above.
At first sight, it may not be obvious why we should worry about this kind of relativity. After all, M is obviously not the intended interpretation of ZF set theory, because relative to M, P(w) M is nondenumerable but we know that P(w) M is really denumerable. The problem, however, is that it is not clear how we do know that P(w) M is denumerable. Under one interpretation of ZF set theory, P(w) M is denumerable; under another, it is not. The claim is that some aspect of our knowledge about sets determines that the first interpretation is the correct one. But this presupposes that there is something to know about sets that one cannot learn through studying all of the true sentences of ZF (or, if you prefer, some other axiomatization of set theory-we could still apply the foregoing argument). 4 Yet this seems strange; how are to understand this sort of knowledge about sets?
Moore's reply claims that there is more to knowing about sets than knowing the truths of some set theory. Thus, he identifies two senses in which you might be said to know what 'Set' and 'member' mean:
You might be said to know what they mean in the sense that you know how to use them properly, and in particular you know which set-theoretical sentences you are entitled to assert (in other words, which are true); this is something that obviously admits of degrees. Or you might be said to know what they mean in the sense that you are sufficiently mathematically sophisticated to be able to grasp the differences between their various possible interpretations and you know which is the intended one. These are not the same, for there is no reason to suppose that knowing how to use the terms involves matching them with, or thinking consciously about, any interpretation. 1 So, the claim is that it is possible to know more about the meaning of 'Set' than knowing which set-theoretical sentences you are entitled to assert, because there is the type of knowledge that belongs to the sufficiently mathematically sophisticated person; it is this knowledge that enables the selection of the correct interpretation from the various interpretations. Moore does not make it clear, I think, why this knowledge cannot be captured by the set-theoretic truths. One possibility is that it is to be treated as know-how rather than as knowledge that; in particular, knowledge of how to grasp the differences between the various interpretations-see again the quote above.
At another point, Moore advances what seems to be a transcendental argument against scepticism regarding knowledge that the standard interpretation is the correct interpretation. He writes:
There is, in the relevant technical sense, more to the meaning of 'Set' and 'member' than shows up in the truths of set theory. But this, like the very content of the Löwenheim-Skolem theory itself, so far from making us doubt our own understanding of what Sets are like, is something that we can only appreciate in terms of that understanding. (It involves us in actually exercising such concepts as that of countability.) 2 I do not find this argument very convincing. I understand it as follows: first, to appreciate that there is more, in the relevant technical sense, to the meaning of 'Set' and 'member' than shows up in the truths of set theory, it is necessary know what the various interpretations are like; second, to know what the various interpretations are like it is necessary to have some mastery of set-theoretic notions; and third, mastery of set-theoretic notions enables us to successfully determine the correct interpretation. I do not accept, however, the first claim of this argument. Why is it not possible to grasp the sceptical problem presented without knowing "what the interpretations are like"? Shapiro thinks that unintended interpretations of set theory do show that certain formulations of set theory (including ZF) are unable fully to describe the system or structure of set theory and so are inadequate for communicating our ideas about that system/structure.
3 (I take it that Moore agrees with this.) He also thinks that unintended interpretations raise the question of how the structure of set theory is apprehended. I have suggested that Moore answers this question by appealing to the know-how of the sophisticated mathematician. Shapiro's alternative approach is to argue that the problem is with ZF set theory in particular, because it is a first-order formulation of set theory. Before sketching the argument we need a definition.
Definition.
We say that an interpretation P of some language L is isomorphic with an interpretation Q of L if and only if there is a one-one correspondence j (called an 1 Moore (1990:168) . 2 Ibid., p169 3 See Melia (1995:127) isomorphism) of the domain of P with the domain of Q such that:
1. For every n-place predicate R and all p 1 , … ,p n in the domain of P we have R It can be shown that second-order formulations of set theory are categorical; that is, all their interpretations are isomorphic. On one view, this is a significant result. Namely, if one is a structuralist about mathematical systems, then the various interpretations of second-order set theory are, since isomorphic to one another, treated as being identical. There is therefore no difficulty in explaining either how ideas about set theory are communicated or how the structure of set theory is apprehended, because a suitable second-order formulation of set theory will, for the structuralist, essentially have a unique interpretation. However, if one is not a structuralist, then it is hard to see that a shift to a second-order formulation will be of any help. The reason is that for those without structuralist sympathies, two interpretations, even if isomorphic, can appear very different. As Melia puts it: "If I am the empty set in your interpretation of set theory, whilst you are the empty set in mine, then even if the two interpretations are isomorphic, we seriously misunderstand each other". 
